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The Battle of Heartbreak Ridge (Korean: 단장의 능선 전투 ; Hanja: 斷腸의 稜線 戰鬪 ; Frch: Bataille de Crèvecœur), also known as the Battle of Wdgli (Chinese: 文登里战斗; pinyin: Wéndēnglǐ Zhàndòu ), was a month-long battle in the Korean War which took place betwe September 13th and October 15th, 1951. After withdrawing from Bloody Ridge, the Korean People's Army (KPA) set up new positions just 1, 500 yards (1, 400 m) away on a 7-mile (11 km) long hill mass. If anything, the defses were ev more formidable here than on Bloody Ridge.
The Battle of Heartbreak Ridge was one of several major gagemts in the hills of North Korea a few miles north of the 38th Parallel (the pre-war boundary betwe North and South Korea), near Chorwon. For the Chinese, this battle is oft confused with the Battle of Triangle Hill, which occurred a year later.
Heartbreak Ridge (1986)
U.S. Army infantrym of the 27th Infantry Regimt, near Heartbreak Ridge, take advantage of cover and concealmt in tunnel positions, 40 yards from the KPA/PVA on 10 August 1952
During the battle of Bloody Ridge, U.S. Eighth Army commander Geral James Van Fleet had submitted an outline plan, called Talons, to United Nations commander Geral Matthew Ridgway visioning an advance of 1–15 miles (1.6–24.1 km) to remove the sag in the Eighth Army's eastern front. Ridgway had turned down more ambitious plans for an amphibious landing near Wonsan and for a deep advance into North Korea, but he had no objection to a modest ground offsive. Preparations for Talons continued until 5 September, wh Van Fleet evidtly took a close look at the final casualty totals from Bloody Ridge. Since Talons would be on a much larger scale, Van Fleet decided that the operation was not worth the probable cost in lives and matériel. Instead he informed Ridgway that he favored sustaining his tidying up on the Eighth Army right flank during the remainder of September, using elbowing tactics without any definite objective line assigned. Around 1 October he would stop his offsive operations in the east, th launch an attack in the west by the U.S. I Corps about the middle of the month, provided the armistice negotiations permitted. If this I Corps maneuver were successful, Van Fleet would follow up with an amphibious operation on the east coast near Tongch'on. This would link up with a land advance northeast from Kumhwa. The quick change in plans by the Eighth Army commander surprised Ridgway, but he posed no objection to the continuance of the limited objective attacks on an opportunistic basis. The proposed amphibious assault, however, Ridgway would only approve for planning purposes.
Acting swiftly, Van Fleet issued a geral directive to his corps commanders on 8 September emphasizing limited objective attacks, reconnaissance, and patrolling. He followed up the directive the same day with instructions to X Corps to take the ridge just north of Bloody Ridge and another north of the Punchbowl. Since the KPA opposite X Corps had just sustained a defeat on Bloody Ridge, Van Fleet thought that immediate thrusts would keep them off balance and would gain the new ridge lines before the KPA had a chance to recover. X Corps assigned the task of taking the peaks north of Bloody Ridge to the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division. The objective was the southern tip of a long, narrow ridge running north and south betwe the Mundung-ni Valley (38°18′40″N 127°59′09″E / 38.311°N 127.9858°E / 38.311; 127.9858 ) on the west and the Sat'ae-ri Valley (38°18′00″N 128°02′53″E / 38.3°N 128.048°E / 38.3; 128.048 ) on the east; spur ridges arching east and west from the main ridge caused one observer to describe the objective as the spinal column of a fish, with hundreds of vertebrae. Possession of the ctral ridge would prevt the KPA from using the adjact valleys to attack the X Corps' defse lines west of the Punchbowl. Heartbreak Ridge, as the objective was later named by news correspondts covering the action, had three main peaks. At the southern terminus was Hill 894 (38°17′23″N 128°00′58″E / 38.2898°N 128.0162°E / 38.2898; 128.0162 ) which commanded the approach from Bloody Ridge, 3 miles (4.8 km) to the south; Hill 931 (38°18′05″N 128°00′58″E / 38.3015°N 128.0161°E / 38.3015; 128.0161 ), the highest peak in the ridge, lay 1, 300 yards (1, 200 m) to the north; and 2, 100 yards (1, 900 m) north of Hill 931 rose the needlelike projection of Hill 851 (38°18′57″N 128°00′59″E / 38.3157°N 128.0163°E / 38.3157; 128.0163 ).
Korean War: Bloody Ridge' Photographic Print
After withdrawing from Bloody Ridge, the KPA had fall back to prepared bunkers, trches, and gun positions covering the approach ridges to Heartbreak that were just as strongly fortified and as well camouflaged as those previously countered by the 2nd Infantry Division. The respite betwe the d of the Bloody Ridge battle on 5 September and the assault on Heartbreak Ridge eight days later permitted the KPA to strgth their defses ev further and to reinforce the units guarding the ridge and its approaches. In the Mundung-ni Valley the KPA 12th Division of the III Corps controlled the hills on the western side of the Suip-ch'on River and the 6th Division of the same corps was responsible for the Heartbreak Ridge and Sat'ae-ri Valley sectors. Aerial reconnaissance had disclosed that the KPA had be very active in the Heartbreak Ridge area, grouping artillery and mortar units in the valleys flanking the ridge. But the heavy woods and undergrowth had veiled the elaborate fortifications and concealed the fact that the 2nd Infantry Division was again faced with the task of breaching the KPA's main line of resistance. Within the 2nd Division there was considerable differce of opinion on the extt of the expected KPA reaction to an attack on Heartbreak Ridge. Col. Edwin Walker, the artillery commander, felt that the North Koreans would fight like hell for it, while some members of the staff contemplated that the response would be less vigorous. Brig. G. Thomas F. Deshazo, the acting division commander, evidtly was among the latter group. He decided to use one regimt, the 23rd and its attached Frch Battalion, rather than two in the assault force. Approaching from the east across the Sat'ae-ri Valley, the 23rd, under Col. James Y. Adams, would cut Heartbreak betwe Hills 931 and 851. One battalion would th turn north to seize Hill 851 while a second would move south to capture Hills 931 and 894. As soon as Hill 894 came under the control of the 23rd, the 9th Infantry Regimt, under Col. John M. Lynch, would advance and take Hill 728, 2, 000 yards (1, 800 m) to the west and slightly south of Hill 894.
On 13 September the elemts of the 2nd Division were in position and ready to attack. The Frch Battalion, under Lt. Col. Ralph Monclar, had tak over the positions of the 38th Infantry Regimt on Hill 868, a little over 2 miles (3.2 km) east of Hill 931, and the 38th had become the division reserve with responsibility for surveillance of the Kansas line. The 9th Regimt was poised to advance on Hill 728 wh the 23rd Regimt gained Hill 894. Direct support for the 23d Regimt would come from the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, under Lt. Col. Linton S. Boatright, and its 105mm howitzers, while the 503rd Field Artillery Battalion (155mm howitzer), 96th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm howitzer), 38th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm howitzer) and Battery C of the 780th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch howitzer) provided geral support. The 37th and 38th Field Artillery Battalions were located about 3 miles (4.8 km) southeast of Heartbreak Ridge. The 96th and 503rd were approximately 7 miles (11 km) south and 9 miles (14 km) southeast of the objective respectively, while the battery from the 780th was near Yach'on-ni, about 11 miles (18 km) south of Heartbreak.
At 05:30 the artillery preparation began and for thirty minutes the guns pounded KPA positions on or near Heartbreak Ridge. Th Colonel Adams gave the signal to start the 23d's attack. The 3rd Battalion, under Lt. Col. Virgil E. Crav, led the way in a column of companies, followed by the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Hry F. Daniels. As the assault troops moved north from Hill 702 up the Sat'ae-ri Valley to reach the east-west spur ridge that would serve as the approach to Heartbreak, the KPA spotted them. Heavy artillery and mortar fire from Heartbreak Ridge positions and from the heights around Sat'aeri town began to pour in on the m of the 23rd Regimt. Despite the growing number of casualties, Crav's forces pressed on, closely followed by Daniels' m. As the 3rd Battalion arrived at the east-west spur and headed up the hill to split the Heartbreak Ridge line, it ran
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